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the king’s request to express his be-
liefs in universal terms (I:11,25; 
Heinemann trans.):  
 
I believe in the God of Abra-
ham, Isaac and Israel, who led 
the Israelites out of Egypt with 
signs and miracles; who fed 
them in the desert and gave 
them the (Holy) Land…who 
sent Moses with His Law, and 
subsequently thousands of 
prophets, who confirmed His 
law by promises to those who 
observed and threats to the dis-
obedient…  
In the same way God com-
menced His speech to the as-
sembled people of Israel: “I am 
the God whom you worship, 
who hath led you out of the land 
of Egypt”; He did not say “I am 
the Creator of the world and 
your Creator.” In the same style 
I spoke to thee, O Prince of the 
Khazars, when thou didst ask 
me about my creed.  
 
In other words, Halevi does not 
deny that Judaism is a religion con-
taining dogmas, but he does deny 
that these dogmas are to be found 
in abstract philosophical principles. 
It is precisely for this reason that I 
cited Halevi’s discussion in 
III:17―to demonstrate that even 
the anti-philosophy school repre-
sented by Halevi accepts that Juda-
ism is a religion defined by specific 
beliefs, and that this is not a Mai-
monidean innovation. (For a good 
overview of the dispute between 
Rambam and Halevi about the mer-
its of philosophy, see R. Sheilat’s 
Bein ha-Kuzari la-Rambam, pp. 13–
36. R. Sheilat explains his transla-
tion decision which upsets Kellner 
on p. 28 n. 26. I used R. Sheilat’s 
translation because I believe it to be 
the most accurate one available, de-
spite Prof. Kellner’s aspersions. As 
it happens, on the relevant line in 
III:17, R. Kafih’s translation is vir-
tually identical:  הלא לכ תא רמאש ימו
תמאב ילארשי אוה ירה ,הרומג הנווכב.)  
 
 
Divine Providence and  
Free Will  
 
I WRITE IN RESPONSE to the erudite 
and informative article of Dr. Alan 
Kadish on the reconciliation of 
G-d’s intervention in the natural 
world with a mechanistic view of 
the universe and its physical laws. 
Specifically, Dr. Kadish refers to the 
work of Dr. Nicolas Saunders, who 
raises issues concerning the recog-
nition of Special Divine Action 
(SDA) within the laws of the cos-
mos. Dr. Kadish similarly examines 
the issue of a deterministic universe 
with regard to Judaism’s resolution 
of the issue of man’s free will in a 
universe determined by the will of 
the Almighty.  
While Dr. Kadish provides a sci-
entific model for so-called SDAs, 
he does not fully address the scien-
tific issues regarding determinism 
and free-will or free-choice. While 
some of Dr. Kadish’s insights (such 
as recent developments concerning 
quantum theory) would be applica-
ble to free will, it would be most 
useful if a further article exploring 
scientific issues regarding free will 
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would be forthcoming. These are 
two very different models of deter-
minism, but the resolution of free 
action in a deterministic system is 
similar. This is an ever more im-
portant issue today as scientists are 
attempting to create a neuro-physi-
cal model of brain activity. Man’s 
actions in affecting (and undermin-
ing) the stability of earth’s eco-sys-
tem is well-accepted by many scien-
tists. Understanding man’s free will 
would obviously also address ques-
tions on the determinism of natural 
laws, since mankind by its actions 
interacts with the world in poten-
tially profound ways.  
With regard to the overall issues 
raised by Dr. Saunders, I had the 
following general comments: 
While the world may seem de-
terministic to a philosopher or a 
physicist (or a mathematician, for 
that matter) examining equations, a 
human being living on earth experi-
ences the world around him or her 
as very much a non-deterministic 
one, a world in which seemingly 
random events occur, many pre-
dictable but others surprising or 
even seemingly miraculous. Mathe-
maticians can predict the likely out-
come of the repetition of independ-
ent random events using what they 
call the “Law of Large Numbers.” 
While there are various theories re-
garding the origin of statistical con-
sistency and the ultimate random-
ness of these events, all agree that 
certain events follow probabilistic 
patterns. These probabilistic laws 
do not dictate the outcome of indi-
vidual events, and, although the 
probability of long term deviation 
from the mean can be measured, 
these deviations occur with a meas-
urable probability. Special Divine 
Action, which we call “hashgacha pra-
tis,” individual providence, can eas-
ily occur within these seemingly 
random events, and believing Jews 
experience such providence, with-
out expecting that this providence 
would violate the natural order of 
the universe. These are included 
within the Modim prayer, recited 
thrice daily, wherein we thank the 
Almighty “… v-al nisecho sheb’chol yom 
imonu (and for the miracles that oc-
cur every day…).” 
Both the Bible and halacha 
assert that nissim, miracles beyond 
the everyday, can occur even in our 
own era. The blessing of “she’oso 
nissim (Who made miracles…”), 
recited on both Chanukah and 
Purim, seeks to publicize the 
miracles of both of those events, 
which are valued equally as 
miraculous, although the miracle of 
Purim may be a nes nistar, a hidden 
miracle. These miracles involved 
not only the burning of oil beyond 
the expected time limit, but 
battlefield victories and political 
decisions ultimately deciding the 
fate of the Jewish people.  
The halacha also seeks to define 
the circumstances for which one 
can recite the individual blessing 
“she’oso li nes ba’makom ha’zeh (Who 
made a miracle for me in this 
place)” on individual miraculous 
events. According to some halachic 
decisors, we would need a miracle 
beyond normal human experience 
to recite such a blessing, but not an 
experience to overrule the laws of 
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the cosmos. The Halacha asserts 
that we can and need to recog-
nize Special Divine Action, even if 
such would not be recognized by 
Dr. Saunders.  
As a final observation, even if 
the “equations” governing the 
physical universe were such as to 
provide unique solutions, and thus 
to determine future results, 
knowledge of these results would 
be predicated on perfect knowledge 
of initial conditions. Precisely be-
cause the equations of complex sys-
tems such as those governing 
weather conditions are unstable and 
heavily sensitive to changes in initial 
conditions, chaotic systems arise 
that are extremely difficult to pre-
dict on a long-term basis. Human-
kind’s knowledge is far from per-
fect; as Dr. Kadish rightly points 
out, the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
principle may even set forth some 
absolute limits on what can be phys-
ically known, since measurement it-
self may interfere in the process and 
make it impossible to measure mo-
mentum and position simultane-
ously. Chazal tell us, “Ain habrocho 
shoruy eleh b’dovor hasomuy min ha-ayin 
(Blessings can reside only in mate-
rial that is hidden from the eye).” 
Much of human experience is, in-
deed, hidden from human eyes, our 
actual measurement (if not the Al-
mighty’s), and it is there that bless-
ings and Special Divine Action can 
take place.  
Principles generally germane to 
the interface of science and religion 
are reviewed by the Rashba in a 
teshuva (Shu”t Rashba [1:9]). The 
Rashba is asked concerning an as-
sertion he had made, based on Tal-
mudic sources that Chazal believed 
that the world would cease to exist 
at the end of 6000 years, a position 
refuted by Maimonides. In this 
teshuva, the Rashba, interestingly 
enough, appears somewhat sympa-
thetic to the position of Maimoni-
des as to the reinterpretation of 
medrashic, or even biblical, texts 
when they come into conflict with a 
naturalistic physical worldview. 
However, Rashba asserts, such a le-
niency in interpretation needs to 
have limits, even for Maimonides, 
when it conflicts with accepted doc-
trines and beliefs derived from rev-
elation. Revelation or prophecy rep-
resents a higher-level wisdom, as 
opposed to the scientific wisdom 
derived from human “hakirah (in-
vestigation).” Rashba maintains that 
the potential end of the universe is 
an accepted kabbalah or received 
tradition among the Jewish people. 
On the matter of the eternity of 
the universe, Rashba understands 
well that science, based on its own 
understanding of the natural order, 
its observations of the stars and 
planets conducting their ordered 
rounds, and the world following its 
formulas and determined ways, 
would not agree with the concept of 
a sudden end to the universe. (Curi-
ously, thanks to advances in scien-
tific knowledge, we can now more 
easily conceive of a catastrophic end 
to human existence than ever be-
fore.) Rashba points, however, to 
the differences in methodology and 
philosophy of scientific wisdom, 
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derived solely from its own obser-
vations and denying any other ave-
nue of truth but its own, and reject-
ing the potential for G-d’s interven-
tion in nature such as the splitting 
of the sea, the giving of the Torah, 
or other miracles. 
A constant of Jewish theology is 
that the Almighty and His Chochma 
(wisdom) are one and the same. 
Since the Almighty cannot be totally 
known, neither can the Chochma, by 
which He orders the universe, be 
totally understood. Our knowledge 
of the universe, dictated by our own 
finite understanding, is therefore 
limited. To this end, Rashba points 
to the incompleteness of man’s sci-
entific knowledge of the world, us-
ing the phenomena of magnetism as 
an example. No doubt, Aristotle, if 
merely told about magnetism, 
would have rejected it as impossi-
ble, as a phenomenon he could not 
explain based on a materialistic in-
terpretation of the universe. Once 
magnetism was demonstrated, Aris-
totle worked to develop a theory for 
magnetic action. (One is reminded 
of Einstein’s characterization of 
gravity as “spooky action at a dis-
tance” and his own efforts to ex-
plain it.)  
Rashba argues that Judaism, too, 
incorporates additional axioms, 
based on its revealed knowledge of 
the Almighty, to explain that G-d, 
the Creator, may intervene in nature 
to preserve the natural order or to 
change it. Therefore, the Rashba as-
serts, even a scientist such as Mai-
monides recognizes that the wis-
dom of the Almighty is greater than 
that of humankind, and that doc-
trine takes precedence over our 
knowledge derived from the natural 
order. Finally, Rashba reminds us 
that science is always subject to 
change, that Plato disproved philos-
ophers before him, and that Aristo-
tle subsequently rejected the teach-
ings of Plato. Therefore a healthy 
skepticism for the claims of science 
needs to accompany anyone in 
seeking to address scientific criti-
cism of religious doctrine. 
Dr. Kadish has shown us how to 
incorporate the opportunity for 
Hashem’s actions even within the 
scientific world-view of natural 
causation. We need to be aware that 
science itself is never complete, and 
that there always is a time and need 
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I ENJOYED the interesting article 
“God, Man, Chaos and Control: 
How God Might Control the Uni-
verse” by Dr. Alan Kadish (Ḥakirah 
volume 20), which considers the ap-
parent conflict between divine 
providence and free will. I would 
like to comment on this article, and 
also add something to what I wrote 
on this subject, in “Divine Provi-
dence and Natural Forces: Conflict 
or Harmony” (H ̣akirah 19). 
 The author asserts (pp. 124–
128) that “Attempts to reconcile 
providence and free will in the Jew-
ish intellectual tradition essentially 
